No, you did not predict this. Nor did I.
It is March 10, and the two men most likely to be the
Republican nominee are a noisy blowhard with a bizarre grab-bag of policies
that defy description or even reality, and a nasty scourge who approaches his
own crabbed view of purity and making enemies with the same Messianic zeal.
How about the wunderkind, Marco Rubio? Crashing—in the four primaries this Tuesday
night, he failed to take a single delegate, and wasn’t competitive in any of
them. His numbers in his home state of
Florida are frightening—if five recent polls are any indication, and the early
voting didn’t lead to a major Marco lead, Trump is going to take the state
comfortably. A Rubio campaign manager
had a virtual screaming match on CNN to deny that some staffers are telling
Marco to withdraw before next Tuesday, but there’s every reason to believe that
those conversations have to be taking place, because a disaster in Florida
could be a body-blow to his future political prospects for any office.
How did it go so wrong so fast? In part, because he got it
so fast. The Rubio package—intelligent,
good-looking, charismatic, eloquent, and Cuban—was catnip to influential Republicans. They elevated him very rapidly—and his
electoral success convinced them that their bet was a good one. It was effectively a blitzkrieg strategy—move
fast, hit hard, and the logistics will either take care of themselves, or
become irrelevant because you’ve already taken the prize.
One of the problems with this approach in politics is that
it is both time specific and personality specific. Let’s start with personalities. Marco did not exactly pay his dues or wait
his turn—and that didn’t just apply to his relationship with Jeb! You can view this as a political variation of
Newton’s Law—every promotion Marco got, every endorsement, every contributor,
had to have come at the expense of someone else—probably someone more senior,
and quite likely, someone more accomplished.
People don’t like getting passed over—especially for someone
who seemed like a trust-fund kid—and there was always someone stretching out a
helping hand for Marco. One of the more interesting aspects of his Presidential
campaign is that it’s arguable that he might have had a hard time winning re-election
to the Senate, if he chose to run. He's not exactly loved or respected for his efforts.
Translating this approach to a Presidential context created a fascinating dynamic. Go back and watch the
body-language of the debates and see the differences in the interaction between
the Governors, Cruz, Trump, and Rubio. Trump, they clearly see as a loon, and
Cruz as an ideologue. But Marco seems to
almost offend them. Why, they seem to be asking themselves, are powerful people
in the party telling them to be nice to Marco?
Why are they being pushed out the door in favor of Marco? Why is Marco himself telling them they should
leave the field to him? And why is Marco’s Super Pac spending so much money
tearing them down, instead of going after Trump and Cruz—the two people that
the Establishment simply cannot abide.
How three remaining Governors reacted is a case-study in
personalities. Kasich, as is Kasich’s wont, has kept his own counsel. He’s rebuffed Rubio’s demands that he drop
out, but has largely stayed out of the scrum. Christie did what Christie does—he lost
it. Furious after Rubio’s supporters buried him under
negative ads in New Hampshire when he thought he was gaining traction, he tore into Marco, diminishing them both a bit, then had a self-immolating
Stepford-Wives moment and endorsed Trump. Jeb’s approach is particularly telling. Jeb has scheduled individual meetings with Cruz,
Rubio, and Kasich, but CBS reported that word from inside the Rubio camp is
that they might not even want an endorsement—might damage the Rubio brand. Perhaps nothing tells you more about the
Bush/Rubio relationship, and, more specifically about Rubio, than Rubio’s
apparent contempt.
Does this matter, now that Christie and Bush are road-kill,
and Kasich possibly not far behind? Yes,
and no. This is where the “logistical”
part of Marco’s strategy may ultimately bring him down. He lacks the infrastructure in key states—he’s
even weak in Florida. Why is anyone’s
guess, but it’s reasonable to draw the inference that he feels others will
provide it for him. This confidence (or
arrogance) is presumably drawn from experience, but it may be misguided. Rubio’s team seems to be clinging to two slim
reeds: He will get the institutional support, and either Republican primary
voters will come to their senses and, after Marco holds Florida, line up behind
him and actually deliver sufficient delegates in the winner-take-all states to
come, or, no-one will go to Cleveland with a majority, and a grateful Party
will turn to him as a savior.
Are outright winner or savior still possible, now that blitzkrieg
is a dead strategy? Possible, but
dependent on a lot of things going perfectly—and going perfectly soon, since
Cruz (no matter how disliked) is getting a second look to bring down the mighty
Trump. The bigger question may have less
to do with tactics, or whether Marco is really loved by his peers, or even
whether he’s sufficiently hardworking. It’s a matter of vibe, and an acknowledgement
that there is a huge tectonic movement going on in the electorate that is
almost as much emotional as it is ideological.
These changes are idiosyncratic—they don’t necessarily fit earlier
voting models, and they involve multiple plates, all in motion at the same
time.
The catalyst is that people feel under assault—their values,
their economic security, their communities.
And they are upset that government has failed to prioritize their
needs. They have different perspectives on
who is to blame—it could be Obama, or the economic elites, or immigrants, or
terrorism, or obstructionist Republicans, or Progressivism, but many are
looking for someone to address their anxiety and their anger.
This is where Rubio’s greatest misjudgment might have been
made. He has been selling the only product he seems to have, a slick electability. The problem is that he’s an emotional cipher
who teeters out of control when he goes off script. Every one of the other
candidates have a lane. Trump is going to thumb his nose at the world, and Cruz
is going to flay Democrats. Kasich is
avuncular. But Rubio—what does he
offer? He’s just about as conservative
as Cruz but doesn’t have the ability to project an assassin’s promise. His self-absorption keeps him from carrying
off Kasich’s almost pastoral approach. And Trump is, well, Trump.
That is the paradox of the Rubio campaign, for all his personal gifts. His ambition has always exceeded his willingness to serve. As the Orlando Sun-Sentinel (who had previously endorsed Jeb) said recently "If you think Marco Rubio can unite the Republican Party under a winning banner, vote for him. But remember he has almost no experience, and has done little but run for office. Then, he when he gets in office, he doesn't go to work very much."
That just isn't going to cut it this year, and it should never be enough. In January, Marco will pack up the few things he's left in his office and go home. He decided last year the Senate wasn't good enough for him. Perhaps, finally, he will have realized that his candidacy didn't catch fire because he doesn’t really stand for anything that people value in their gut. And when you don’t stand for something—when you don’t stand with someone—they won’t stand with you.
That just isn't going to cut it this year, and it should never be enough. In January, Marco will pack up the few things he's left in his office and go home. He decided last year the Senate wasn't good enough for him. Perhaps, finally, he will have realized that his candidacy didn't catch fire because he doesn’t really stand for anything that people value in their gut. And when you don’t stand for something—when you don’t stand with someone—they won’t stand with you.
Michael Liss (Moderate Moderator)
Please join us on Twitter.
